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HORIZONTAL INNOVATION AND
INTERFACE PATENTS
Bernard Chao
ABSTRACT
Scholars understandably devote a great deal of effort to studying how
well patent law works to incentive the most important inventions. After all,
these inventions form the foundation of our new technological age. But very
little time is spent focusing on the other end of the spectrum, inventions that
are no better than what the public already has. At first blush, studying such
“horizontal” innovation seems pointless. But this inquiry actually reveals
much about how patents can be used in unintended, and arguably,
anticompetitive ways.
This issue has roots in one unintuitive aspect of patent law. Despite the
law’s goal of promoting innovation, patents can be obtained on inventions
that are no better than existing technology. Such patents might appear
worthless, but companies regularly obtain these patents to cover interfaces.
That is because interface patents actually derive value from two distinct
characteristics. First, they can have “innovation value” that is based on how
much better the patented interface is than existing technology. Second,
interface patents can also have “compatibility value.” In other words, the
patented technology is often essential to make products operate (i.e.
compatible) with a particular interface. In practical terms, this means that an
interface patent that covers little or no meaningful advance can give a
company the ability to extract rents and foreclose competition.
This undesirable result is a consequence of how patent law has
structured its remedies. For years patent law has implicitly awarded both
innovation and compatibility values. Recently, the courts have taken a
sensible first step and excluded compatibility value from reasonable royalty
recoveries for standard essential patents. This Article argues that the law
needs to go further and do the same for all essential interface patents.
Additionally, patent law should reform the way it awards injunctions and
lost profits to also exclude compatibility value. This proposal has two
benefits. It would eliminate the incentives for wasteful patents on horizontal
technology. Second, and more importantly, the value of all interface patents
would be better aligned with the goals of the patent system.
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HORIZONTAL INNOVATION AND
INTERFACE PATENTS
Bernard Chao*
“. . . the framers of the patent system did not require an inventor to
demonstrate an invention's superiority to existing products in
order to qualify for a patent.”1
INTRODUCTION
Scholars understandably devote a great deal of effort to studying how
well patent law works to incentive the most important inventions. After all,
these inventions form the foundation of our new technological age. But very
little time is spent focusing on the other end of the spectrum, inventions that
are no better than what the public already has. At first blush, studying such
“horizontal” innovation seems pointless. But this inquiry actually reveals
much about how patents can be used in unintended, and arguably,
anticompetitive ways.
This issue has roots in one unintuitive aspect of patent law. Despite the
law’s goal of promoting innovation, patents can be obtained on inventions
that are no better than existing technology. Such patents might appear
worthless, but companies regularly obtain these patents to cover interfaces.
That is because interface patents actually derive value from two distinct
characteristics. First, they can have “innovation value” that is based on how
much better the patented interface is than existing technology. Second,
interface patents can also have “compatibility value.” In other words, the
patented technology is often essential to make products operate (i.e.
compatible) with a particular interface. In practical terms, this means that an
interface patent that covers little or no meaningful advance can give a
company the ability to extract rents and foreclose competition.
This undesirable result is a consequence of how patent law has
structured its remedies. For years patent law has implicitly awarded both
innovation and compatibility values. Recently, the courts have taken a
*
Bernard Chao is an associate professor at the University of Denver, Sturm College of
Law. Thanks to Frederico Cheever, Kristelia Garcia, Cynthia Ho, Brian Love, David
McGowan, Viva Moffat, Justin Pidot, Michael Siebecker, Harry Surden, Phil Weiser and
the participants of the Patent Law Conference at the University Of San Diego School of
Law (2015), Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at Stanford Law School (2012) for
advancing my thinking on this paper.
1
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1508 (10th Cir.
1995).
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sensible first step and excluded compatibility value from reasonable royalty
recoveries for standard essential patents. This Article argues that the law
needs to go further and do the same for all essential interface patents.
Additionally, patent law should reform the way it awards injunctions and
lost profits to also exclude compatibility value. This proposal has two
benefits. It would eliminate the incentives for wasteful patents on horizontal
technology. Second, and more importantly, the value of all interface patents
would be better aligned with the goals of the patent system.
Part I examines the odd rule that allows patents to be obtained on
inventions that are no better than existing technology. The U.S. Constitution
and long established case law both say that the underlying goal of the patent
system is one of maximizing innovation, and not rewarding individuals.
Indeed, the different statutory patentability requirements confirm this basic
notion. Nevertheless, none of the different patent statutes require better and
the courts have specifically rejected this very idea. This has opened the door
for patents that do not cover true technical advances.
Using three real world examples, Part II explains that the “better”
loophole is not just a theoretical concern. Companies obtain patents on
horizontal innovation and use them to foreclose competition. First, Part II
discusses the patented Gillette razor/handle interfaces of the Mach 3 and
Fusion shaving systems. These interfaces did not cover any improvement in
the technology of connecting razor to handles. But they did foreclose
competition in the market for razors that connect to Gillette handles.
Next, Part II describes the case of patent holdup associated with the
NWay Ethernet auto-negotiation protocol. Because this simple technology
was included in the ubiquitous Ethernet 802.3 standard, the company that
purchased the underlying patents was able to holdup an entire industry. The
NWay example helps make two points. First, it demonstrates that horizontal
innovation exists in technology far more complex than razors and handles.
Today’s technical standards inevitably require some form of interface and
companies obtain standards essential patents to control these platforms.
Second, the NWay story illustrates the enormous value this form of
interface patent can have even when it only covers horizontal innovation.
Part II concludes by describing the interface used by the latest
generation of iPhones and iPads, Apple’s patented Lightning interface. By
focusing on patents that cover purely horizontal technology, the previous
examples helped isolate the “compatibility value” that such patents have.
But the Lightning patents cover a real advance, albeit a small one. In
addition to providing access to products that use their interface, such patents
derive value from the technological advances the patents contribute. The
Lightning example illustrates how an interface patent that covers a modest
advance still gives the patentee disproportionate power to the close the
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platform that uses its interface.
Part III addresses two different lines of relevant thinking that are based
on “competition values” and “patent values” respectively. The competition
value literature focuses on the role that interface patents play in the
development of technical standards. But for the most part, such works treat
patents monolithically. They assume each patent contributes the same fixed,
but unmeasurable sized advance. In contrast, the patent values literature
proposes reforms that depend on the particular contribution a patent makes.
However, they don’t talk specifically about interface and standards. Rather
they assume that patents cover true advances. In contrast, this article
examines how interface patents are currently valuable above and apart from
any advance they cover. It also explains how this situation is not consistent
with patent goals.
Part IV returns to the doctrinal world and explains how patent remedies
have implicitly awarded both innovation and compatibility value over the
years. However, at the end 2014, the Federal Circuit took a step in the right
direction and excluded compatibility value from reasonable royalty
recoveries.2 This Article argues that patent law should extend this rule to all
essential interface patents regardless of whether they are part of a formal
standard. In addition, patent law should also exclude compatibility value
from the way it awards injunctions and lost profits. This requires
eliminating both injunctions and lost profits for all necessary interface
patents. Instead the law should only award reasonable royalties that are
calibrated to the magnitude of the patent’s contribution above and beyond
the prior art while specifically informing any fact finder that they must
exclude compatibility value.
Having explained how patent law should deal with interface patents,
Part V takes a brief look at the larger picture and notes that interface patents
are actually just one of five different tactics companies use to tie products
together and foreclose competition. Oddly, these tactics are governed by
different substantive laws – namely patent, antitrust law, traditional
copyright law and the DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act). The
result is a hodgepodge of different standards and values. Part V does not
attempt to reconcile these different laws. Rather, it suggests that further
work needs to be done to make the larger picture cohesive.
I. THE “BETTER” LOOPHOLE
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to enact laws that
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
2

See infra notes 153 to 162 and accompanying text.
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Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”3 The Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on
this clause to declare that the fundamental purpose of patent law is to
promote innovation. To the extent that inventors receive financial rewards,
it is simply a byproduct of encouraging innovation.4 Patent law implements
its innovation goal through a number of different requirements found in
Sections 101, 102, 103 and 112 of the patent laws. I review these statutes in
brief to show how they seek to promote innovation. Notably, these
requirements are merely innovation proxies. None of these statutes actually
require that a patented invention fulfill the Constitutional mandate of
promoting the progress of science.
Section 101 of the Patent Act broadly defines patentable subject matter
as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”5 The courts have
interpreted § 101 to contain two distinct requirements.6 Inventions must
relate to subject matter that is eligible for patent protection and inventions
must have utility. Both these requirements are aimed at promoting
innovation.
The subject matter patent eligibility requirement prevents would be
inventors from obtaining patents on basic laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas.7 The doctrine has been in a considerable
flux with the Supreme Court recently issuing controversial opinions on the
eligibility of medical diagnostic, biotechnology and software patents.8
Although these decisions have been roundly criticized as lacking coherence,
the purpose of the doctrine remains clear.9 The goal of the subject matter
patent eligibility requirement is to ensure that patents do not place too large

3

Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to make laws
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
4
See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The patent
monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries.
Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”).
5
35 U.S.C. § 101.
6
Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents, 165 (3rd Ed. 2014).
7
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
8
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012);
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013);
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l et al., 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014).
9
See e.g., Robert Merges, Go ask Alice - what can you patent after Alice v. CLS
Bank?, (Jun. 20, 2014) (explaining the difficulty of applying the Court’s new two step
subject matter eligibility test) available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposiumgo-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-v-cls-bank/; Bernard Chao, Moderating
Mayo, 107 NW. U L. REV. 423 (2012) (discussing the reaction to Mayo).
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a burden on later innovation.10 The Supreme Court has characterized the
underlying concern as one of “pre-emption” and said that monopolizing the
basic tools of scientific and technological work “might tend to impede
innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”11
Section 101 also requires utility. The Supreme Court has said that until
an invention has been refined to the point where it has utility, there is
insufficient justification for issuing a patent.12 Such a patent may turn out to
cover a “broad field,”13 and presumably, hamstring later innovators. In
practice, utility has three prongs: (1) operability (2) substantial utility and
(3) specific utility.14 Each of these prongs must be satisfied to satisfy the
utility requirement.
Operability requires that an invention actually achieve its intended
result.15 Substantial utility focuses on whether the invention has “enough”
utility. In other words, the patent application “must show that an invention
is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove
useful at some future date after further research.”16 Specific utility requires
that an invention “provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the
public.”17 The purpose of this requirement is to deny patents for inventions
where the asserted use is “so vague as to be meaningless.”18 Together the
different prongs of the utility requirement are intended to limit patents to
those inventions that provide actual and specific benefits to society without
placing too large a burden on downstream innovation.19
Sections 102 and 103 require novelty and non-obviousness
respectively.20 A person is not entitled to a patent unless her invention was
novel. Novelty ensures that the invention is new and prevents anyone from
obtaining a patent on knowledge that the public already possesses.21 Section
Mayo, supra, 132 S.Ct.at 1293. (“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant
of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”
11
Alice, supra, 134 S.Ct at 2358. But see Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About
Preemption, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 563 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s reliance on a
preemption justification distracts from the real policy issues underlying the subject matter
patent eligibility debate).
12
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
13
Id.
14
Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV 1046, 1066 (2014).
15
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual Of Patent Examining Procedure § 2107.01
(9th ed. rev. 2014).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
19
Seymore, supra note 14 at 1065. Seymore argues that utility has not been applied in
manner that serves these goals. Id. at 1076 .
20
35 U.S.C. § 102 and § 103.
21
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989)
10
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103 builds on section 102’s novelty requirement by saying that even if the
invention is novel, the person is not entitled to patent if the invention was
somehow obvious. Non-obviousness denies patents to trivial variations of
current technology because such inventions presumably would have come
about through ordinary technological progress.22
Finally, Section 112 discusses what information the written description
(also called the specification) of a patent must contain. Three distinct
doctrines grow out of § 112. They are known as the definiteness,
enablement and written description requirements. A patent is invalid for
indefiniteness if its claims fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those
skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.23 Unclear claims burden
innovation in several ways.24 Companies may end up foregoing technology
that is not actually covered by a patent. Alternatively, they may pay for
licenses they don’t need. Even when these kinds of problems don’t occur,
there are substantial transactions costs associated with trying to identify the
contours of unclear claims. The definiteness requirement attempts to reduce
all these costs by incentivizing inventors to draft clearer patent claims.25
Section 112 also requires that a patent enable the claimed invention. To
satisfy this requirement, the specification must describe “the manner and
process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use . . . the
invention.”26 This requirement is satisfied when a person of ordinary skill
in the art, after reading the specification, could practice the claimed
invention without undue experimentation.27 The enablement requirement
(noting that Thomas Jefferson believed that “a grant of patent rights in an idea already
disclosed to the public [i]s akin to an ex post facto law, ‘obstruct[[ing] others in the use of
what they possessed before”’ (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 326, 327
(Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., Library ed. 1904))); Curtis, supra note
39, §378.
22
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007); see also Bonito Boats, 489
U.S. at 151, 156 (stating that nonobviousness standard provides “a careful balance between
the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through
imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive
economy”).
23
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
24
See Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV 1359, 137275 (2014) (providing a more thorough discussion of the problems of unclear patent
boundaries).
25
Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124.
26
35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
27
See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (“Enablement . . . is not precluded even if some experimentation is necessary,
although the amount of experimentation needed must not be unduly extensive . . . .”).
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serves two functions both of which are tied to innovation. First, by
requiring the inventor to inform the public how to practice the invention, §
112 encourages the dissemination of ideas. Second, by constraining the
permissible scope of claims, § 112 prevents a patent from placing too large
a burden on downstream innovation.28
Like the enablement requirement, the written description requirement is
rooted in 35 U.S.C § 112. The relevant passage says that “[t]he specification
shall contain a written description of the invention.”29 To satisfy the written
description requirement, the specification “must clearly allow persons of
ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is
claimed.”30 In other words, the written description requirement guards
against claims that depart too far from the invention actually found in the
specification. Again, this preserves incentives for later innovation.
Despite the numerous statutory requirements, there is no patent statute
that expressly requires that an invention must somehow be “better” than
what was done before. Only § 101’s utility doctrine contains any hint that
patents must cover inventions that improve on existing technology. It’s not
hard to imagine how the substantial and specific utility requirements might
evolve to also require that inventions be better than the prior art. After all,
an invention that does not improve on technology does not seem to have
any real use.
But the Supreme Court rejected precisely this expansion of the utility
requirement in 1817. In Bedford v. Hunt, Justice Story said that “[i]t is not
necessary to establish, that the invention is of such general utility, as to
supersede all other inventions now in practice to accomplish the same
purpose . . . The law does not look to the degree of utility.”31 Story’s view
persists to this day. Recently, the Federal Circuit has said that “[a]n
invention need not be the best or the only way to accomplish a certain result
. . .”32 In fact, an invention that is “less effective than existing devices” can
still satisfy “the statutory criteria for patentability.”33 These decisions
28

Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the
New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 at ¶¶ 57-58, available at
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/chao-rethinking-enablement.pdf.
29
35 U.S.C § 112(a).
30
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
32
See Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991); See also,
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1506 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“to meet patent law's usefulness requirement, a product need not be better than other
alternatives or essential to competition.”; Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 4.01
(2015).
33
Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 n.12 (Fed.
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demonstrate that patent law does not require that patents be “better” than the
prior art. In Part II, this Article describes how companies take advantage of
this innovation loophole to prevent others from making compatible products
and close standards.
II. HORIZONTAL INNOVATIONS
Despite the fact that patent law does not require “better”, market forces
typically would counsel companies to only patent inventions that advance
technology. After all why would anyone waste their time and money
patenting inventions that are slower, less efficient or otherwise worse than
what was done before? Unfortunately, there are areas where the other
incentives exist. Specifically, companies regularly seek to obtain a patent
just to control an interface.34 Whether the underlying technology is better,
may not matter. 35 A company using this tactic is simply trying to control
competition in the market for complementary products.
For the purposes of this article, I will refer to inventions that do not
improve on prior technology, as “horizontal innovation.” Because my focus
is on questionable patents, this article only uses the term to refer to
inventions that satisfy the existing statutory requirements discussed above.
Of course, horizontal innovation is far less beneficial than innovation that
advances technology. Indeed, some may question whether the term
“innovation” is even appropriate for an invention that does nothing better
than what society already possesses. But horizontal innovation still requires
an odd kind of ingenuity. Inventors must make a new and non-obvious (i.e.
satisfy §§ 102 and 103) interface to obtain a patent. In practice, that often
means that inventors add unnecessary and arbitrary complexity to their
invention.36 The sole purpose underlying these technical bells and whistles
is to justify a patent by showing the patent office that the invention is
sufficiently different from the prior art – or in patent terms, not obvious.
In the following subsections, I establish that the “better loophole” is
Cir. 1986).
34
Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, 93 Minn.
L. Rev. 1943, 1962 (2008) (suggesting that the ability to control a platform is a more
“powerful reason” for obtaining an interface patent than recouping investment in the
technology).
35
Maureen O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L.
Rev. 1177, 1218 (2000)(suggesting that some interfaces have low intrinsic value, but
O’Rourke does not suggest that they may have no intrinsic value).
36
Samuelson, supra note 34 at 1963 (discussing how some patented interfaces are
arbitrary variations of existing techniques). See also e.g. infra note 37 to 45 and
accompanying text describing the patented Gillette interfaces and note 74 (discussing the
patented escape code sequence of the Hayes smart modem).
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more than just a theoretical concern. The examples below demonstrate that
real world companies do obtain interface patents on horizontal innovation.
Moreover, these patents give their owners the ability to control the market
for complementary goods and even close platforms.
A. Razors and Handles
Consider U.S. Patent No. 5,787,586 (“the ‘586 patent”) which covers
the Gillette Mach 3 Razor interface. The patent describes a shaving system
with replaceable cartridges. The features necessary to connect the cartridge
with the handle are intricate. A cropped version of figure 2 is depicted to the
left below. It shows how the handle and cartridge connect.37 These
components mate with trapezoidal shaped recess at the bottom of the razor
and are claimed by the patent.38 Thus, it is not surprising that the patent
satisfied the novelty and non-obviousness requirements.39 There was
probably nothing like this particular interconnection mechanism in the prior
art. It is also clear that the claimed invention satisfies Section 101’s utility
requirement and Section 112’s written description and enablement
requirements. The combination of components serves some use and ‘586
patent specification clearly provides sufficient detail.
Nevertheless, there is no suggestion that prior methods of connecting
razors and handles were somehow lacking. Indeed, it would be surprising if
the shaving industry was unable to make a solid connection by the mid1990’s when the Mach 3 patents were filed. Moreover, there is also no
indication that this invention is somehow better than what was done before.
Although not required, the specifications of many patents explain why the
claimed invention improves on existing technology. Nothing of the sort is
found in the ‘586 patent.
A patent on a subsequent Gillette shaving system, the Gillette Fusion,
37
The handle contains a spring based plunger, u-shaped ejector and “ejector” button
‘586 patent at col. 5, lines 58-60 and col. 7, lines 52-57.
38
Claim 1 is representative and states: A razor comprising
a replaceable shaving cartridge including a pivotal housing and an interconnect
member,
said housing carrying one or more blades, a guard, and a cap, and having a camming
surface,
said interconnect member having a pivotal support structure that pivotally supports
said housing for pivoting about a pivot axis and a central base structure having a recess and
an opening from said recess facing said camming surface, and
a handle having a cartridge support structure shaped to mate with said recess and a
spring biased plunger that has a cam follower surface and extends from said cartridge
support structure and through said opening to act on said camming surface to bias said
housing.
39
Section 102 and 103.
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provides additional evidence of horizontal innovation. The Fusion also has
another new and different patented interface.40 Although the Fusion patent
identifies “advantages”, these advantages do not appear to represent
improvements over the Mach 3 interface. For example, the first supposed
advantage is that the “connection . . . can secure the cartridge to the handle
for use during a trimming operation . . .” However, the earlier Mach 3
interface performs the same function for that system.41 One commentator
has suggested that the key improvement over the Mach 3 was “the space
between the blades . . . and the number of blades [five instead of three]”,
features that have nothing to do with the manner in which the cartridges
connect to the handle.42 A physical inspection of both systems also fails to
identify any improvement in the Fusion interface.43 Both handles connect to
the cartridges in a surprisingly similar way. The cartridges fit on a spring
biased plunger and are released by an ejector button found on the respective
handles44 At least superficially, the primary difference between the two
interfaces is that the plunger in the Mach 3 runs parallel to the main body of
the handle interface while the Fusion’s plunger runs perpendicular to the
corresponding structure in that handle. Nonetheless, Gillette still obtained
three patent families that covered the handle and its connection to the
cartridge.45

See e.g. U.S. Patent No. 7,168,173 entitled “Shaving System.”
The other listed advantages are: “[t]he connecting member can be easily disengaged
from the handle by actuating the release button, which causes the pusher to engage the
connecting member. Increasing s cing of the contact point between the plunger and the
housing from the pivot axis tends to provide leverage for biasing the blade unit toward its
rest, spring-biased position.” ‘173 patent at 2: 67-3:5.
42
Christian Sternitzke, Interlocking patent rights and modularity: Insights from the
Gillette Fusion, p. 12, DRUID (2012).
43
I have purchased both systems and compared them.
44
The plungers are labeled as 44 in ‘586 patent and 134 in the ‘173 patent while the
ejector buttons are labeled 50 in the ‘586 patent and 196 in the ‘173 patent.
45
Id. at 9, 13.
40
41
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Mach 3 Interface Patent
Fusion Interface Patent
The likely purpose of such patents was to enable Gillette to prevent
competitors from making razors that operate with Gillette handles.46 In
other words, Gillette has used patent law to effectively tie the sale of its
razor to the sale of its handles. Now some competition law scholars argue
that this tie is harmless. Competitors can make their own razor/handle
combinations thereby preventing Gillette from extracting monopoly rents
from its razor sales.47 Yet, Gillette’s high profit margins suggest this view
may not paint an entirely accurate picture.48 Perhaps, Gillette’s ability to
charge high prices it due to brand recognition. But Gillette is certainly not
relying on that advantage. It obtains patents on its interfaces, and there do
not appear to be any competitors openly selling Gillette compatible razors
in the United States.
But the point of this example is not to engage in the debate about
whether or not Gillette’s interface patents allow it to obtain monopoly
rents.49 Rather the example is intended to show that companies are
sufficiently motivated to obtain interface patents on technology that does
not advance innovation in any way. That means that society is not receiving
anything of technological value when it grants patents on these kinds of
interfaces. By contrast, the patents certainly give their owners something of
value. They effectively act as “patent ties.” Such patents give their owners
the right to prevent other companies from using the interface. Consumers
46

Mark Blaxill and Ralph Eckardt, The Invisible Edge: Taking Your Strategy to the
Next Level Using Intellectual Property, p. 144 (2009) (discussing how some Fusion patents
“prevent third-party cartridge makers from selling knockoff cartridges.”)
47
Randal C. Picker, The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s), 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (2011)
(“Standard economics suggests that a firm playing razors-and-blades will face entry into
the blades business and that entry will destroy the possibility of subsidizing handles with
expensive blades.”); see also Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45
(2006)(“Many tying arrangements, even those involving patents and requirements ties, are
fully consistent with a free, competitive market.”)
48
The Forbes website lists Gillette as the world’s 27 th most valuable brand saying:
“Razors are one of the most profitable businesses for P&G with operating margins of 32%.
Procter & Gamble controls 70% of the global blades and razors market led by Gillette.”)
available at http://www.forbes.com/companies/gillette/ (last checked February 16, 2015).
49
The debate over the competitive effects of tying continue to this day. See infra note
168 and accompanying text and compare Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the
Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 400 (2009) (arguing
that critics of tying make several restrictive and unwarranted assumptions); Erik
Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangement and Antitrust Harm, 52 Ariz. L.
Rev. 925, 928 (201) (disagreeing with Elhauge and suggesting that tying that results in
metering only harms competition “in the most flagrant situations”, and they it often
increases welfare).

14

Horizontal Innovation

[3-Feb-16

must purchase complementary products from the patent owner or its
licensees. Thus, Gillette’s interface patents are valuable because they have
“compatibility value”; they allow it to control who does and does not make
razors that operate with Gillette’s handles. Importantly, an interface patent
can have compatibility value even when it only covers horizontal
innovation.
B. Fast Handshakes
The problem of horizontal innovation is not limited to just basic
mechanical devices like the Gillette razor. For example, one aspect of
today’s technical standards is their interface. Technology companies can use
patents on horizontal technology to close a platform and control the market
for hardware and software that operate on that interface.
The story of National Semiconductor’s (“National”) NWay autonegotiation technology provides a good example of this situation. In the
early 90’s, the IEEE 802.3 Working Group was developing a new “Fast
Ethernet” standard that would allow equipment to transmit at 100 Mbps
over copper wire.50 Fast Ethernet needed to be backwards compatible so
that new equipment could continue to communicate with the existing
installed base. That meant that the new standard needed to include some
form of auto-negotiation technology that would allow different types of
equipment to “negotiate” how they would transmit data (i.e. say what mode
they were using). The 802.3 Working Group considered several alternative
technologies including National’s Nay technology.51
At its core, the NWay technology is surprisingly simple. Earlier local
area networks used the Ethernet communication protocol. One flavor of
Ethernet (10Base-T or twisted pair) would issue a “link test pulse” to
determine the presence of compatible equipment at the other end of the link.
The link test pulse was a very short pulse with a 16 millisecond interval.
Figure 10A from U.S. Patent No. 5,617,418, one of National’s NWay
patents, depicts the timing of the link test pulse (below).52

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) is a standard-setting
organization. IEEE standards include the prominent 802 series (e.g. WIFI and Ethernet
standards) which are designed to enhance the interoperability of communications products.
51
Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC No. 051 0094, Complaint ¶ 11 (Jan. 23, 2008)
(hereinafter “FTC Negotiated Data Complaint”).
52
This was simply one patent in larger family of NWay patents.
50
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National’s NWay technology added “fast link pulses” to help different
devices determine which technology they would use to communicate. Fast
link pulses differed from the previous link test pulse because they occurred
in bursts, not singly. Those pulses are depicted in Figure 10B (immediately
below Figure 10A). A new device would recognize the fast link pulse and
interpret that to mean that the device at other end of the link could
communicate using the new faster technology. The device would respond in
kind sending its own fast link pulses. Such a negotiation told both devices
to communicate using the newer technology. In contrast, an old device
knew nothing of fast link pulses. When such devices received fast link
pulses, they would only notice the first pulse in series of fast link pulses and
interpret the signal to be the old link test pulse. The older device would
respond in the only way it knew how sending the link test pulse. The newer
device would interpret a link test pulse signal to mean that it was
communicating with an older device that could only use the slower
technology.
National committed to licensing NWay for one thousand dollars
($1,000.00) in the event that the IEEE included NWay into the standard.53
Subsequently the IEEE adopted a Fast Ethernet standard with an
autodetection feature based upon the NWay technology. After the adoptions
of the standard, manufacturers incorporated the Fast Ethernet standard with
the NWay technology into billions of dollars of computer devices such as
personal computers, switches, routers, DSL and cable modems, wireless
LAN access points, IP phones, and other equipment.54 By 2001, the FTC
53
Decision and Order, In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC (FTC, Sept. 9,
200S), FTC File No. 051-0094, Attachment A to Appendix C (Letter dated June 7, 1994
from Mark Grant, Director of Intellectual Property, National Semiconductor Corp. to
Geoffrey Thompson, Chair, S02.3 Working Group, IEEE) (hereinafter "N-Data FTC
Decision”).
54
M. Sean Royall and Adam J. Di Vincenzo, The FTC's N-Data Consent Order: A
Missed Opportunity to Clarify Antitrust in Standard Setting, Antitrust, Summer 2008, at
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said that there was no commercially viable alternative auto-negotiation
technology for Ethernet.55 At the same time, many of these manufacturers
did not bother to formally accept National’s offer and pay the nominal fee.
This omission provided an opportunity for the subsequent owners of the
NWay patents.
For four years, National did nothing to enforce the NWay patents.
Eventually, National assigned the NWay patents to Vertical Networks, a
corporate spin-off.56 In 2002, after Fast Ethernet and a successor standard
known as “Gigabit Ethernet” had taken firm root, Vertical Networks, the
new owner of the NWay patents, retracted the prior $1,000 licensing
commitment and began seeking licenses in the neighborhood of ten cents
per Ethernet port.57 Given the billions of dollars of Fast Ethernet equipment
(e.g. hubs, routers, switches, modems) in place at the time and the rate at
which new equipment was continuing to be sold, Vertical Network’s royalty
demands were enormous.
These tactics triggered a FTC investigation that resulted in a consent
degree that required Vertical Networks to honor the original $1,000 offer
made by National.58 So for most attorneys, Vertical Networks stands as a
cautionary tale against reneging on standards commitments.59 But this story
also helps us understand that the lessons about horizontal technology are
limited to simple world of mechanical interface, they apply equally well to
the high tech industry and standards essential patents.
The NWay auto-negotiation technology represents another example of
horizontal innovation – technology that was no better than existing
alternatives. Both the nature of the technology and its original $1,000 fee
suggest that the NWay technology did not represent a meaningful advance.
The only important function NWay provided was a unique signal that would
serve to identify a device as supporting the new Fast Ethernet technology.
There were several alternatives that the IEEE could have selected.60 The
reason NWay was selected was likely because of the nominal fee National
originally offered. If NWay was truly superior to the other alternatives,
84.
55

FTC Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 51 ¶ 21.
FTC Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 51 ¶ 23. Vertical Networks later
assigned the patents to Negotiated Data Solutions. Like the FTC’s filings, this discussion
refers to both entities together as Vertical Networks.
57
Royall and Di Vincenzo, supra note 54 at 90.
58
See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Negotiated Data
Solutions LLC, FTC No. 051 0094, at 4 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/05/0094/180122Analysis.pdf.
59
See e.g. Michele K. Herman, Negotiating Standards-Related Patent Licenses How
the Deal Is Done, Part 1, 3 Landslide 35 (2010).
60
FTC Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 51 at ¶ 11.
56
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National could have charged far more than $1,000.61
Despite covering little or no technical advance, this story shows the
disproportionate value patent law bestowed on the NWay patents. The
patents gave Vertical Networks the ability to demand enormous royalties.62
That value was not based on any technical advance that the patents
contributed to the standard. Rather, NWay patents were valuable because
companies needed a license to them to make products that were IEEE 802.3
compatible.63 In other words, the NWay patents possessed tremendous
compatibility value. Without such a license to the NWay patents, companies
risked being enjoined and shut out of the networking market. 64 What’s
more, they could be subject to outsized damage awards.65
Compatibility value can be further broken down into ex post and ex ante
compatibility values. Ex post compatibility value is the value a patent
possesses because it allows patent holders to “holdup” a company that has
already adopted the patented technology.66 Companies are particularly
vulnerable to patent assertions after they have sunk large investments into
designing, manufacturing and marketing a product.67 If such a company is
found to infringe a patent, they will have large switching costs.
Consequently, patent holders can negotiate outsized royalties that are
primarily based on these switching costs, and not the value of any
innovation the patent contributes.68 For the most part, the competitive harms
of patent holdup are well known and both the courts and commenters have
sought ways to curb the holdup problem.69
61

Some may quibble about whether NWay was better.
Royall and Di Vincenzo, supra note 55 at 84.
63
See e.g. Norman V. Siebrasse and Thomas F. Cotter, A New Framework for
Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Litigation, __ Fla. L. Rev. __, 10-11(Dec 21,
2015 SSRN Draft) (explaining why issuing injunctions for standards essential patents
results in holdup).
64
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388 (2006), the risk of such an injunction has been reduced but not disappeared.
65
See infra Part IV discussing how patent remedies implicitly awards interface
patentees compensation for benefits achieved from operating with a particular interface.
66
See Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in StandardSetting Organizations, 77 ANTIRUST L.J. 855, 862 (2011); Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl
Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTIRUST L.J.
603, 607-610 (2007).
67
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007); See also, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 191 (Mar.
2011) available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ipmarketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307
patentreport.pdf.
68
Id.
69
See e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006)
62
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However, far less attention has been paid to the ex ante component of
compatibility value. Ex ante compatibility value is the value a patent
possesses because companies simply wish to enter a market that requires a
license to a particular interface patent. In these cases, concerns about patent
holdup are not present because new market entrants do not have any sunk
costs. In other words, interface patents don’t possess ex post compatibility
value in these contexts. Nonetheless, these patents still have ex ante value
because market entrants still may desire to sell products like Gillette
compatible replacement razors.70
Now some commentators don’t object to patents possessing ex ante
compatibility value.71 For example, Norman Siebrasse and Thomas Cotter
say that reasonable royalties should take into account the fact that a “patent
did wind up being included in the standard.”72 They arrive at this conclusion
because they believe that “a patent incorporated into a standard is, all other
things being equal, of greater social value than one that is not . . ..”73 But
Siebrasse and Cotter are simply pointing out that patents have compatibility
value. Although such patents may have greater total value, I am only
willing to reward them for improving on the prior art (i.e. innovation value).
As the NWay example demonstrates, patents with little or no innovation
value still can have both significant ex post and ex ante compatibility value.
In other words, an NWay license was valuable because it helped companies
avoid switching costs. Moreover, regardless of any sunk costs, having the
right to sell products into the Ethernet market was still valuable for those
companies that had yet to enter the market. However, neither of these
values make the standard any better.
Of course these lessons apply to standards generally.74 Companies can
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (pointing out that injunctions against patent infringement “may
not serve the public interest” in cases where “the patented invention is but a small
component of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations.”); See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to
Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L.Rev. 149 (2007).
70
See Jorge Contreras and Richard J. Gilbert, A United Framework for RAND and
Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKLEY TECH L. J. 1451, 1468 (2015) (pointing out that
patentees can exploit a company’s lack of alternatives after a standard has been adopted).
71
Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 63 at 5 (arguing that patentees should be entitled to
recover that “value that is conferred upon an individual SEP by virtue of its incorporation
into the SSO’s chosen standard.”)
72
Id. at 5-6.
73
Id. at 6.
74
Another good example of horizontal innovation in the standards context is the
patented escape code sequence used in Hayes compatible modem the de facto standard. In
re Hayes Microcomputer Prods, Inc., 982 F.2d 1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Trial
testimony suggested that the particular characters chosen to represent the escape code were
“arbitrary” and had no advantages. Id. at 1538-39.
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develop arbitrarily different interfaces and patent them. They can then use
those patents to close access to those standards or obtain royalties. It is
apparent that these remedies are undeserved when the patented interface is
no better than existing ones. That is because the patent remedies implicitly
allow interface patentees to recover for compatibility value (both ex ante
and ex post).75 The result is that the public is issuing a valuable patent while
receiving nothing in return. Unfortunately, as the next example illustrates,
the same kind of problem also exists with interface patents that cover real
advances.
C. Apple’s Lightning Interface
In this section, I describe an example of interface patents that cover a
real, albeit, modest advance. Like the NWay patents, such patents are
valuable because of the compatibility benefits they provide. But they are
also valuable for a second distinct reason. They improve on prior interfaces.
This is precisely the type of public benefit that the patent system desires.
Unfortunately, these patents also can be used to control platforms and
obtain rewards that have no connection to the size and nature of the advance
the patent covers.
Apple Computer has developed and patented just such an interface. It is
the Lightning interface used in the latest generation of iPhones and iPads.
Previous generations of the iPhone and iPad used 30 pin connector
illustrated below to left below. Apple developed a smaller Lightning
connector that it introduced with the iPhone 5 and iPad 3 (found in the
center below). This connector is covered by U.S. Patent Nos. 8,573,995 and
8,461,465.

75

In this example, compatibility value includes the switching costs that is often the
focus of the holdup problem. See e.g. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 67 at 2008-10. But the
Gillette example illustrate how compatibility value does not need to be associated with
holdup. New entrants to the razor market do not have costs associated with switching
designs. They are simply deciding whether to make Gillette compatible razors or not.
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There was a general consensus that the old 30-pin connector used in the
previous iPhone 4 was outdated. Many of its pins were no longer used and it
made sense for Apple to move to a smaller more compact iPhone 5
connector.76 However, Apple did not have to design a new connector itself.
It could have used the open micro-USB standard (depicted to the right
above). Indeed, the European Union was urging all smart phone
manufacturers to adopt that standard.77 Even though the micro-USB
connector was smaller and more compact, Apple chose to develop the
Lightning connector and patent it. One possibility is that the Lightning
connector was no better than the micro-USB connector and Apple just
wanted to exert control over the market for complementary market for
iPhone 5 products. However, there is reason to believe that the Lightning
connector was better suited for Apple’s needs than the micro-USB
connector. The micro-USB connector could only carry 9 watts of power, but
Lightning connector could carry 10 watts. Nine watts was sufficient for
smart phones like the iPhone 5, but Apple was also using the same
connector for its new generation of iPads.78 Using the Lightning connector
allowed iPads to recharge at substantially faster speeds. Thus, the Lightning
was apparently better than the prior art in at least one respect.
Because these patents cover an advance, they don’t offend patent law in
the way patents on horizontal innovation do. Nonetheless, current law gives
the owner of these patents disproportionate power. By patenting the
Lightning interface, Apple could demand a royalty for the right to make
products that are compatible with iPhones and iPads.79 Thus, companies
that wish to make compatible speakers, credit card swipers or other
accessories need a license from Apple.80 This is true even if Apple own no
applicable intellectual property in the way the accessory otherwise operates.
For example, Bose, a noted speaker company, may have developed
76
Anand Lal Shimpi, Brian Klug & Vivek, Gowri, Lighting 9-pin:Replacing the 30pin Dock Connector (Oct. 16, 2012)(discussing why the 30-pin dock connector was
destined for a more modern, compact replacement . . ..”) available at
http://www.anandtech.com/show/6330/the-iphone-5-review/14
77
Bryan Chaffin, EU Approves Universal Smartphone Charger Standard, the Mac
Observer,
(Dec.
30,
2010)
available
at
http://www.macobserver.com/tmo/article/eu_approves_universal_smartphone_charger_sta
ndard.
78
Steve Wildstrom, Why Apple Couldn’t Go to Micro USB Charging, Mashable,
(Sept. 6 2012) available at http://mashable.com/2012/10/29/apple-lightning-micro-usb/.
79
This is purely from a physical perspective. Other intellectual property undoubtedly
helps Apple control what software may run on the iOS operating system.
80
More and more physical connections are becoming obsolete and are being replaced
by wireless ones. The same analysis could easily be done for wireless standards, but their
technical details are unduly complex.
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significant innovations for its sound system, but still have to pay Apple for
the privilege of making a speaker system that docks with the iPhone 5.
Importantly, these companies probably do not care about how fast the
Lightning interface allows iPhones and iPads to charge. These companies
simply want to be able to sell their products to the millions of Apple
customers. In other words, even though the Lightning patents possess both
compatibility value and technical value, it's the compatibility value that
dominates.
Now lets’ take a step back. Relying on the NWay story, I explained why
interface patents on horizontal technology should not give their owners the
right to control access to products that use the patented interface. But
patents like the Lightning patents are different because that cover some
meaningful advance. These inventors should be rewarded because the
patents have made a meaningful contribution to the public. The key is to
disentangle innovation value from compatibility value and only allow the
patentee to only recover for the former category.
III. PRIOR THINKING
Part III addresses two lines of relevant thinking. In Section A, I discuss
proposals concerned specifically with interface patents and standards. To a
large extent, these commentators focus on “competition values”, the role
that interface patents play in promoting (or stunting) technical standards.
But for the most part, such works treat patents monolithically. They assume
each patent contributes the same fixed, but immeasurable sized innovation.
My proposal seeks to inject another dimension into these standards focused
discussions so that they think about patents in a more nuanced fashion.
In Section B, I discuss a different line of thinking that seeks to change
patent law to align it more closely with its underlying innovation advancing
goals. This line of thinking focuses on “patent values”, as distinguished
from the “competition values” discussed in Section A. Commentators that
think about patent values often propose reforms that depend on the
particular contribution a patent makes. This article follows in this patent
centric tradition, but it extends on that thinking and applies it to issues that
appear to be unique to the interface and standards world.
A. Interface Theory
Many commentators have debated whether interfaces should be
patented, and if so to what extent. In 2008, Pam Samuelson discussed more

22

Horizontal Innovation

[3-Feb-16

than twenty five different suggestions for regulating interface patents. 81 The
various proposals Samuelson reviewed sought to achieve more
compatibility among information and communications technologies.82
For the most part, these commentators focused on how patents are used.
Others suggest that recommendations need to turn patents competitive
environments. All these characteristics certainly help us understand the role
patents play in competition. But the qualities are all extrinsic characteristics
that have no connection to what the patent contributes. Often the resulting
policy recommendation does not care whether the patent covers an
important new advance or an invention that is no better than existing
technology (i.e the patent’s intrinsic value). But from patent perspective, it
makes little sense to discuss interface patents without thinking about the
most important patent values, the nature and degree of innovation the patent
contributes. The main thrust of this article is to suggest that good patent
policy (including any policy addressing interface patents) needs to
incorporate that dimension into its decision making.
Several commentators have suggested banning patents on interfaces or
immunizing their use.83 For example, some have argued that under
European law, software patents cannot cover interfaces because they are
simply unpatentable “ideas and principles.”84 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court may have already implicitly adopted this proposal in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank, a broad sweeping decision that has invalidated many
different categories of software patents.85 On a similar vein, the European
Parliament considered, but ultimately rejected, a proposal that would have
declared the use of software interface patents as non-infringing.86 Julie
Cohen has also suggested effectively doing away with interface patents that
lockout competition by relying on the patent misuse doctrine.87 Finally, Phil
Weiser has also relied on patent misuse to limit interface patents, but his
“Competitive Platforms Model” focuses on market factors as opposed to
81

See Samuelson supra note 34 at 2004.
Id.
83
See Samuelson, supra note 34 at 1970-1979 (providing a survey of these different
proposals).
84
W.R. Cornish, Inter-operable Systems and Copyright, 11 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 391
(1989); Council Directive 91/250, On the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991
O.J. (L 122) 42, 43 (EC).
85
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l et al., 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014); see also, Digitech
Image v. Electronics for Imaging, 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(finding that a patent that
described the format for tagging digital images was invalid in view of Alice).
86
Samuelson, supra note 34 at 1978.
87
Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091,
1181 (1995) (Cohen calls this a paradox because enforcing one’s right leads to losing that
very right).
82
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any patent specific factors.88
Notably, none of these proposals isolate the issue of horizontal
innovation. Rather, they focus on the harms of patenting interfaces
regardless of the significance of the advance covered by the patent. To
illustrate this distinction, we can delve into Cohen’s misuse proposal. It is
fairly representative of those proposals that would effectively eliminate or
render ineffective interface patents. Cohen used the facts from Nintendo’s
dispute with Atari to justify the application of misuse.
In that case, Nintendo had developed a security system for its game
console, the Nintendo Entertainment System (“NES”), to prevent
unauthorized games from running on the console.89 The security system was
covered by a patent and the underlying software by copyright law.90
Through a combination of reverse engineering and subterfuge, Atari
developed its “Rabbit” program to unlock the NES so that it could freely
develop games and sell them to customers that owned Nintendo’s systems.91
Nintendo sued for both patent and copyright infringement. Nintendo lost on
its copyright claims but the court found that Atari infringed Nintendo’s
patent.92 Although Atari had raised patent misuse as a defense, the parties
settled before the court reached that issue.93
Cohen has characterized Nintendo’s patent assertion as a
“straightforward” case of patent misuse. She explains:
Nintendo's patent monopoly extended only to the lock-out
programs embedded in its console and cartridges, not to the
console itself, nor to the console operating system . . . . Nintendo's
subsequent use of the lock-out patent to ensure that only its
licensees could gain access to the console was an unlawful
extension of the patent grant. 94
Cohen’s analysis oversimplifies the patent analysis in the Nintendo case
by distinguishing the lock-out program from the console itself. However,
88

Phil Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 534 (2003).
89
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 835-37
(Fed.Cir.1992).
90
Nintendo’s patent was U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635 entitled “System for Determining
Authenticity of an External Memory used in an Information Processing Apparatus”.
91
Atari Games, 975 F.2d at 837. Atari had applied to the Copyright Office for a
reproduction of the 10NES program falsely saying that it was a defendant in an
infringement action and needed a copy of the program for that litigation.
92
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401, 1403 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
93
Cohen, supra, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. at 1104.
94
Id. (emphasis added).

24

Horizontal Innovation

[3-Feb-16

the lock-out program did not exist apart from the physical components that
resided on both the console and the cartridge. Moreover, even if we could
somehow separately identify some “ethereal” interface that existed in
between the components it connected, Cohen’s distinction does not
accurately reflect what Nintendo’s patent covered. For example, claim 1
from that patent contains limitations that correspond to the console’s data
processor, an authenticating processor that resides on the console (the 2nd
recited authenticating processor) and a “control means” for resetting the
system.95 Thus, Cohen is not being totally forthright when she says that
Nintendo’s patent does not extend to the console. It did. And interface
patents almost always claim parts of the devices that connect to the
interface.96
Cohen’s characterization is really a conceptual one and it makes
imminent sense from an innovation perspective. The technology claimed in
Nintendo’s patent did not allow either the console or the cartridge to operate
better. The games did not play any faster or use less storage. Nor were the
graphics any more precise. Nevertheless, Nintendo sought to use the
interface security patent in a manner that went beyond the security system
itself. It was seeking to control consoles and cartridges too. That certainly
sounds like the “straightforward” case of patent misuse that Cohen
identified.
But the problem with Cohen’s proposal and others like it is that they
don’t consider the varying levels of innovation the patents may cover.
Cohen does not discuss whether Nintendo’s patent represents an advance
over the prior art. For example, a new interface could allow products to
95

Claim 1 recites:
A system for determining whether a videographics software program is authorized for
use in an information processing apparatus, comprising:
a main data processor unit for executing a videographics software program;
an external memory for storing the videographics software program and for removable
connection to said main processor unit, said external memory and main processor unit
together constituting the information processing apparatus for executing the videographics
software program;
a first authenticating processor device associated with said external memory for
executing a first predetermined authenticating program to determine the authenticity of said
external memory;
a second authenticating processor device which is installed in said main data processor
unit for executing a second predetermined authenticating program to determine the
authenticity of said external memory; and
control means for resetting said main data processor unit unless the execution of said
first authenticating program by said first processor device exhibits a predetermined
relationship to the execution of said second authenticating program by said second
processor device.
96
For example, both Gillette’s interface patent and the Apple Lightning patent include
physical element from the component that use their respective interfaces.
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communicate faster or include additional information.97 Now that does not
appear to be the case with Nintendo’s patent which merely provided a
method for authenticating cartridges. When that kind of patent is being used
to foreclose competition for devices that connect to it, the patent is not
serving any patent purpose. In other words, because there is no innovation,
the patent system does not need to reward its inventor. It may make sense to
declare these kinds of patents unenforceable. But the harder case occurs
when an interface patent covers a real innovation. There are patent reasons
(i.e. incentivizing innovation) for issuing and enforcing such patents.
Cohen’s proposal does not recognize this distinction. Taken at face value, it
appears that Cohen would declare that all interface patents -- even if
significantly innovative -- unenforceable because of misuse. The approach
described in this paper differs from Cohen’s proposal by only nullifying
those patents that did not represent an advance over the prior art.
Phil Weiser also suggests using patent misuse to limit interface patents,
but he focuses on a different factors – specifically, the competitive market
where the patented interface resides.98 Relying on what he calls the
“Competitive Platforms Model”, Weiser would allow companies to use
intellectual property to close their standards so long as there was
competition between rivals.99 For example, because videogame
manufacturers, like Sony, Nintendo and Microsoft compete vigorously,
under Weiser’s theory, these companies should be allowed to use their
intellectual property to close their respective platforms. However, when a
single platform wins out and becomes dominant (e.g. Microsoft Windows),
the standard should become open.100 Doctrines of fair use and patent misuse
would come into play to prevent enforcement of copyright rights and
patents respectively.101 Weiser’s proposal is intended to place incentives at
a time when they are needed the most, before market dominance is
achieved.102
While the competitive platforms model certainly advances our thinking
about optimizing competition, it also does not consider the innovation
97

For example, around 2001, Intel developed and patented a quad pumped front side
bus to allow its processors to communicate faster with chipsets. See e.g. U.S. Patent No.
US 6,807,592 entitled “Quad pumped bus architecture and protocol.”
98
Weiser, supra note 88 at 556.
99
Id. at 536 (“This model embraces proprietary development where there is
competition between rival platform standards, but calls for open standards where a single
platform standard wins out . . .”)
100
Id.
101
Id. at 556.
102
Id. at 583 (“the competitive platforms model . . . reconciles the need to confer the
investment incentives necessary to spur innovation with the risk of protecting proprietary
dominance.”)
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dimension. Put more concretely, taking Weiser at face value, he would
permit enforcement of an interface patent that reflected no technical
advance (i.e. horizontal innovation) so long as the underlying platform had
significant competition. At the other end of the spectrum, Weiser’s model
suggests that the law should not enforce an interface patent covering a
significant advance if the patentee already had a dominant position in the
underlying platform. Both these scenarios are problematic. Patents that
don’t cover a technical advance should not give their owner any rights.
Since Weiser only examines a patent’s context and not the quality of the
patent itself, his model is really not considering patent values (i.e.
rewarding inventors for innovations that benefit the public). While the law
might wish to temper that reward when the patent covers an interface,
eliminating interface patents in some market contexts is a drastic step that is
at odds with core patent law principles. To be fair, Weiser admits that his
model “is only one component of a more comprehensive vision for
regulation . . ..”103 The current proposal takes a different tact then Weiser.
It would open every standard, but allow the interface patent owner to extract
rents based on the level of innovation the patent contributed.
In sum, recent thinking on interface patents often focuses on
competition values and treats interface patents monolithically. But patents
do not just come in one flavor. They can cover horizontal innovation,
modest advances, pioneering inventions or anything in between. My
proposal seeks to distinguish between all these patents and adjust the
remedy accordingly.
B. Patent Injury
Others have previously complained that intellectual property laws often
give their owner strong rights that are incompatible with the underlying
goals of those laws.104 In particular, Christina Bohannan and Herbert
Hovenkamp argue that IP law should only recognize harm “that is tied to
the purpose for which the IP laws were passed in the first place.”105
Bohannan and Hovenkamp label such harm as an “IP Injury.”106 For patent
law, claims of infringement that have “no impact on the incentive to
innovate” are not IP Injuries.107 Thus, Bohannan and Hovenkamp would
limit the ability to assert patents against infringements that could not be

103
104

Id. at 540.
Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Creation without Restraint, 33, 39

(2012).
105

Id at 51.
Id.
107
Id. at 53.
106
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foreseen at the time of the invention.108 More concretely, they suggest
prohibiting inventors from amending their claims to capture after arising
technology.109
But Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s focus is on whether a particular
policy encourages innovation at all. They do not examine the nature of the
innovation itself. A natural extension of Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s
proposal is to question incentives to innovate that do not improve on current
technology. Because these innovations do not promote progress, this article
argues that patent law should not encourage these horizontal innovations.
To borrow Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s terminology, infringement of
patents that merely cover horizontal innovation should not count as a
“compensable IP injury.”
That is not to say that commentators have not thought about working
on different patent law levers to account for size of the contribution the
patent makes over the prior art. They have. For example, Dan Burk and
Mark Lemley have argued that patent law should give greater claim scope
to so called “pioneering inventions.”110 Similarly, many other have argued
that damages should be apportioned based on the incremental value the
patented invention adds to the prior art.111 However, those commentators
have not studied the far end of the innovation spectrum, where patents cover
arbitrarily intricate inventions that are no better than what society already
has. Indeed, there appears to be an assumption underlying all these
proposals that a patented invention must be at least a little better than the
prior art.112 But in the context of interface/standards, patents on horizontal
innovation are still valuable. This article exposes the competitive harm
these patents inflict and offers a remedies based proposal to address it.
IV. A REMEDIES SOLUTION

108
Id. at 57-58 (explaining that unforeseen or “speculative” infringements would not
affect an innovator’s decision to create a work).
109
Id. at 70.
110
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743, 1796-97 (2009); but see, Brian J. Love,
Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 379 (2012)(criticizing the
pioneer invention doctrine and arguing that other doctrines give pioneer inventors generous
rights.)
111
See infra notes 133 to 136 to and accompanying text.
112
The pioneering invention doctrine that Burk and Lemley mention gives such
inventions more expansive scope under the doctrine of equivalents. But no one has
suggested constraining that scope for patents that cover only minor advances. Similarly,
Amy Landers discusses how to apportion damages based on the patent’s contribution over
the prior art, but she never suggests awarding no damages when that contribution is
valueless. Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and Sequential
Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 473–74 (2012).
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In the past, I have suggested that refining remedies offers the best way
to calibrate patent law to handle varying degrees of infringement.113 I
believe that a similar solution also makes sense for the problem of
horizontal innovation. After all, measuring infringement and measuring
innovation are very similar endeavors. The former determines the gap
between the accused device and the patent; while the latter assesses the gap
between the patent and the prior art. Both these kinds of differences can be
thought to reside on a continuum. Because money damages also resides on
a spectrum, it can be used to calibrate incentives to correspond to value the
patented invention.
But for the most part, that does not happen in today’s regime. One
problem with the way patent remedies has historically operated is that it
allowed patent holders to obtain injunctions and receive large damages
awards even when the patent covered technology that is no better than the
prior art. That allowed the patentee to capture value that stems from access
to products that use the interface (“compatibility value”) as opposed to
value that stems from the patented improvement (“innovation value”).
To illustrate this problem, we can consider the patented Apple Lightning
interface.114 The interface is apparently better than the prior art because it
allows iPads and iPhones to charge more quickly. The patents also allow
Apple to control who sells products on those platforms. Both characteristics
are valuable, but only one is related to the patented technical advance. My
proposal would limit Apple to recovering reasonable royalties for the value
of charging devices more quickly, not for the value of being able to sell
Apple compatible products.
In practice, that means changing the way patent law awards damages
and issues permanent injunctions. Patent law should only award a remedy if
the underlying technology is better than the prior art. To achieve this goal
patent law will have to stop awarding lost profits and issuing injunctions for
all necessary interface patents because innovation and compatibility values
are inextricably bound together in those remedies. Moreover, reasonable
royalty damages will have to be limited to the value of the technical
advance and no value should be attributed simply because the interface
helps a product achieve compatibility. The Federal Circuit has already
taken a step in this direction when calculating reasonable royalties for
standards essential patents.115 But the court needs to extend this concept to
113

Chao, The Infringement Continuum, supra note 24 at 1404-12.
I use the Apple example to illustrate the power an interface patent has, but Apple
has not used its Lightning patents to prevent companies from making Lightning to USB
cords that essentially open up the iPad and iPhone platform from a physical connection. In
short, Apple is NOT enforcing its Lightning patents in the way I hypothesize here.
115
See infra notes 153 to 162 and accompanying text.
114
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encompass all necessary interface patents.
To illustrate the different aspects of this proposal, this section proceeds
in two parts. First, section A explains why injunctions will no longer be
available for any necessary interface patents Second, section B describes
how patent’s law damages framework needs to change to encourage the
innovation values that lie at the heart of the current proposal.
A. Injunctions
Denying a reward to those that have developed technology that is not
better than the prior art should be fairly uncontroversial. Those inventors
have not contributed anything meaningful to the public. Therefore, they
deserve nothing. This rather basic insight has practical significance. At a
minimum, it means that owners of patents that cover purely horizontal
technology should not be entitled to injunctive relief. That proposition begs
another harder question. Should injunctive relief be available to interface
patents that cover real advances? Surprisingly, the answer is again no.
Injunctions should not be awarded for any necessary interface patent.
To understand why the prohibition against injunctions should also
apply to better interfaces, it important to keep in mind that the basic goal of
my proposal is to isolate innovation value and provide a share of that value
(and only that value) to the patentee. Interface patents have a unique
characteristic. The reason why companies want to use a particular interface
often stems from the popularity of the platform, and not the technical
benefits of the particular interface. For example, the reason why a company
wants to make credit card swipers that work with iPhones and iPads has
nothing to do with the fast charging Lightning interface and everything to
do with those products’ commercial success. In other words, companies
would seek to use the Lightning interface even it were not better than other
interfaces. They just want the opportunity to sell their products to the
millions of customers that use Apple’s products.116 In short, those
companies value Apple’s Lightning interface patents because of the
considerable compatibility value they possess, and not because of the
patents’ innovation value.117
Unfortunately, when permanent injunctions are issued, the patentee
inevitably recovers for the value of gaining access to any complementary
products. The compatibility value manifests itself in two ways. The
patentee can foreclose competition in complementary markets (i.e. enforce
See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(noting that when a technology is incorporated into a standard, . . . that technology is not
always used because it is the best or the only option; it is used because its use is necessary
to comply with the standard.”)
117
Id. (noting that “widespread adoption of standard essential technology is not
entirely indicative of the added usefulness of an innovation over the prior art.”)
116
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the injunction) or extracts rents from those markets (i.e. requires infringer to
pay money to lift the injunction).118 That’s why Gillette can prevent others
from making razors that work with Gillette’s handles.
The issue becomes more complicated when patents actually cover
better technology. In these situations, the patentees undoubtedly are entitled
to some remedy when others use their invention. But that recovery should
be based on benefits that stem from the advance the invention contributes
(i.e. how much better the patented interface is than the prior art).
Unfortunately, injunctions on interface patents allow their owners to do
much more. Again, consider Apple’s patented Lightning interface. The fact
that the interface allows devices to charge more quickly certainly has some
value. But it should not give Apple the ability to determine who can and
cannot make devices that operate with its iPads and iPhones. That would
vastly overcompensate Apple for figuring out how to increase charging
speeds. Put more generally, patent law should give inventors incentives to
innovate. But those incentives should not be so large that it allows inventors
to capture benefits associated with complementary goods, as distinguished
from the advance in the interface itself.
The first step in changing this result is to eliminate the availability of
injunctions for all necessary interface patents. I use the term “necessary” to
describe interface patents that other companies need to infringe in order to
make products that operate with some complementary products. This
definition includes any standard essential patent but it goes further and
includes interfaces that are not part of any formal standard, like the way
Gillette’s handles connect with its razors.
This proposal would be a fundamental shift from the current law. For
many years, courts had automatically awarded prevailing patentees a
permanent injunction against further infringement.119 However, in eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held that courts should apply
the traditional four-factor test they use in other areas of the law.120 Those
factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without the
injunction; (2) whether there is an adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance
of hardships on the respective parties; and (4) whether granting an
injunction would disservice the public interest.121
In practice, that has meant that when an infringer competes with the
patentee, the patentee can typically obtain a permanent injunction. That is
because courts generally view money damages as adequate for nonpracticing entities.122 Such entities are simply seeking to obtain the highest
118
Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse As Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 503, 505
(2011)(discussing the problems of using intellectual property to foreclose)
119
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (eBay II), 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d+ 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
120
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
121
Id. at 390–91.
122
See e.g. ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312,
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royalty they can. In contrast, when the patentee is competing with the
infringer, money damages are often inadequate because the parties are
fighting over future market share.123 Since eBay was decided, patent
holders who compete with an infringer have been granted permanent
injunctions in 84% of the cases while patentees who did not compete only
receive injunctions 21% of the time.124 Returning to our examples, under
current law, Apple and Gillette are likely to obtain permanent injunctions
against companies that infringe their patented interfaces because they would
compete with any infringer. In contrast, a Vertical Networks (a nonpracticing entity) would not be able to obtain an injunction against future
infringement of the NWay patents.
The proposal would change how courts apply the eBay factors, in a
manner that is fully consistent with eBay’s general framework. The basic
premise is that inventors are only entitled to capture a share of the benefits
the patented invention contributes, but no more. Under this view, a properly
sized royalty should be considered adequate compensation. Importantly, the
owner of interface patent would not be entitled to control the market for
complementary products. Thus, the first two eBay factors are satisfied.125
Denying injunctive relief for necessary interface patents is also
consistent with the third eBay factor, which requires examining the balance
of hardship. Again, if we accept the basic premise -- that interface inventors
should receive a royalty, but not obtain value for helping achieve
compatibility - the balance of hardship clearly weighs against issuing an
injunction. Although the infringer must pay some royalty for the benefit it
receives from the patented advance, the infringer would suffer from serious
hardship if it could not compete in a market at all. In contrast, so long as
1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (denying injunctive relief after finding money damages were
adequate in view of patentee’s extensive licensing efforts, and no direct competition).
123
Bernard Chao, Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World, U. PA. L. REV.
Online, 61, 63 (2016); See e.g. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142,
1152-53 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(patentee demonstrated that it would sustain irreparable harm
from competitor's infringement of patents given undisputed evidence of direct
competition).
124
See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay:
An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. at *36 (July 18, 2015 draft on file with author)
(counting district court decisions through the end of 2013); see also Colleen V. Chien &
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
10 tbl.1 (2012) (finding that district courts granted NPEs injunctions in 26% of total
requests and only 7% when the injunction was opposed by the infringer from May 2006
through August 2011); Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts
Return to the Prior Practice of Granting Injunctions for Patent Infringement, 8 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67, 71 (2009) (because such entities are seeking money, courts
generally find no irreparable and that money damages are adequate).
125
The first and second eBay factors are often considered to be corollaries. If one is
true, the second follows. See, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note at 111 (noting
that courts often analyze the first two factors together).
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the patentee receives the appropriate royalty, it has not suffered a
recognizable hardship.
The fourth public interest factor also weighs against issuing injunctions
in these types of cases. eBay signified a shift in focus from one based purely
on the property rights of patentees to a more public-minded analysis.126 The
current proposal follows a similar vein. Given that the purpose of patent law
is to incentivize inventors to make disclose meaningful advances, it only
makes sense to compensate patentees for “innovation value” not
“compatibility value.”
Now the courts have recently taken a small step in a similar direction.
In Apple v. Samsung (Apple I), the Federal Circuit placed a significant
limitation on the ability of a patentee to obtain a permanent injunction.127 It
is not sufficient to show that the infringer’s sales are causing irreparable
harm to the patentee, there must also be a “causal nexus” between the
infringing feature and the harm.128 A literal application of this requirement
would probably eliminate injunctions for most minor features. As the court
said “sales lost to an infringing product cannot irreparably harm a
patentee if consumers buy that product for reasons other than the
patented feature.”129 Thus, the Federal Circuit is now assessing whether to
issue a permanent injunction based on how much the patented feature
contributes to the infringing product.
However, the causal nexus requirement does not solve the basic
problem with interface patents. It limits the availability of injunctions to
those patents that contribute features that are sufficiently significant that
they drive consumer demand. These are patents that possess significant
innovation value.130 Unfortunately, this solution masks the underlying
problem by burying the importance of compatibility value. Because these
patents contribute significant advances, it is easy to assume that they should
be entitled to an injunction.131 But that is not the case. Awarding injunctive
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 397 (suggesting that the courts can use their “equitable
discretion over injunctions” to “adapt to the rapid technological and legal developments in
the patent system.”).
127
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The
Federal Circuit initially discussed the “causal nexus” requirement in the context of the
standard for determining preliminary injunctions. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co,
678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (2012)(“Apple I”); But see, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (Apple
IV), No. 2014-1802, 2015 WL 9014387, *5 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2015), modifying and
superseding 801 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (weakening the causal nexus standard
established in Apple I); See Chao, Causation and Harm, supra note 123 (criticizing Apple
IV).
128
Id.
129
Id. quoting Apple I, 678 F.3d at 1324.
130
As a practical matter, this may be a very small a subset of interface patents.
131
In fact, Contreras and Gilbert argue that there does not need to be any “special
analysis” in determining whether to grant an injunction for a standard essential patent
subject to commitment to license it under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
126
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relief inevitably gives patentees undeserved compatibility value. To the
extent that interface patents cover significant advances, damages recoveries
should increase and that should suffice.
Importantly, the idea of eliminating injunctions for necessary interface
patents is only part of the larger proposal.132 Inventors of innovative patents
still need to be fairly compensated. But because injunctions give their
owners value unrelated to the contribution the interface patents make,
injunctions should not be issued in these cases. Instead, it makes far more
sense to provide money damages for those patents that cover real advances.
That discussion follows in the next section.
B. Damages
Identifying horizontal innovation is not easy. Sophisticated companies
will undoubtedly be able to disguise their interface patents on horizontal
innovation and argue that they cover some meaningful advance over the
prior art. The current proposal takes this possibility into account and offers
a solution that can adjust to the varying levels of innovation that exist in the
real world. Because money damages are easily adjusted and fall on
spectrum, my proposal relies on awarding reasonable royalties that
correspond to the size of the patented advance. I am not the first to offer this
kind of proposal. At different times, Congress considered adopting
legislation that would explicitly require apportionment.133 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has discussed the need to apportion damages as far back as
Garretson v. Clark.134 However, the concept has been obscured by the
fifteen factor Georgia-Pacific test that is currently used to calculate

Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 70 at 1457.
132
This conclusion adds to growing chorus of scholars that advocate for the
elimination/reduction of injunctions in similar contexts, albeit for many different reasons.
Samuelson, supra note 34 at 2009 (suggesting that injunction should not be issued for
necessary interface patents so long as damages can cover R&D costs); Peter Lee, The
Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH L. REV. 39, 44-45 (2008) (arguing that
courts should use injunctions less when considering infringement of patents that cover
infrastructure); O’Rourke, supra note 35 at 123-34 (arguing that infringers of application
programming interface patents should be able to continue to infringe under the doctrine of
fair use, but pay compensation at “less than fair market value”); but see Contreras &
Gilbert, supra note 70 at 1462 (arguing against a rule denying injunctive relief for SEP
saying that “an injunction may be necessary . . . to bring the [infringer] to the bargaining
table.”)
133
See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009); Patent
Reform Act of 2008, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
134
Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (“The patentee . . . must in every case
give evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's
damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features.”)
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reasonable royalties.135 Several commentators have urged the courts restore
the doctrine to prominence by insisting that they identify a patent’s
inventive contribution before assessing damages.136
I will not repeat the many worthy arguments in favor apportionment, but
I have two points to add in the context of necessary interface patents. First,
lost profits don’t make sense for interface patents. As is the case for
injunctions, lost profits allows the patentee to capture value associated with
the infringer achieving compatibility with other products that use the
interface. Therefore, lost profits should be discarded and all damages
should be awarded using a reasonably royalty calculation. Second, the
existing “hypothetical negotiation” framework for calculating reasonable
royalties also does not work for interface patents. The law must explicitly
exclude compatibility value from the hypothetical negotiation. Otherwise,
reasonable royalty calculations will suffer from the same problems inherent
in injunctions and lost profits. Thankfully, the Federal Circuit has already
begun to adopt the second recommendation for standard essential patents.137
1. Lost Profits
Under the statute governing patent damages, a prevailing patentee can
receive lost profits.138 But if the patentee does not have any lost profits or is
unable to prove them, a reasonable royalty is always available.139 The
problem with lost profits theory is that it tries to return the patentee to the
place she would have occupied had there been no infringement.140
135

See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). A number of commentators have
complained about the difficulty of applying this test consistently. See Landers, supra note
112 at 491; Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 627, 628 (2010).
136
See e.g. Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 70 at *36; David O. Taylor, Using
Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 144 (2014)
(suggesting that the Georgia Pacific test should “focus” the analysis on “the value of
patented technology”); Landers, supra note 112 at 473; Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M.
White, Using Apportionment to Rein in the Georgia- Pacific Factors, 9 Colum. Sci. &
Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (for arguments in favor of apportionment).
137
See infra notes 153 to 162 and accompanying text.
138
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court.”).
139
Id.
140
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964)
(“[The] question (is) primarily: had the Infringer not infringed, what would Patent HolderLicensee have made?” (quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d 469, 471
(5th Cir. 1958))); Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886) (stating that a

3-Feb-16]

Horizontal Innovation

35

Unfortunately, in the case of interface patents, that recovery inherently
includes value unrelated to the contribution the patent makes. A lost profits
theory allows the patentee to implicitly recover compatibility value.
Consider Gillette’s March 3 and Fusion shaving systems again. To gain
access to the millions of Gillette customers, a competing razor manufacturer
would need to include Gillette’s patented interface in its razors and thereby
commit patent infringement. Under current law, Gillette would clearly be
able recover lost profits associated with any sales that the competitor took
from Gillette.141 In this case, all the lost profits are really attributable to
compatibility values. The only reason for a competitor to infringe would be
to gain access to customer’s that previously purchased Gillette’s handles.
The lost profits have nothing to do with any technical contributions made
by the patents because there was none.
The lost profits problem extends to interface patents that cover real
advances too. To illustrate this point, I make a slight variation to the
Lightning example. Assume that besides charging devices more quickly, the
Lighting interface made products that used the interface less expensive to
manufacture.142Additionally, assume that Apple is competing with
EasySwipe, a company that makes infringing credit card swipers that
connect to iPads and iPhones. Again, under current law, Apple will be able
recover lost profits for all the sales that Apple lost to EasySwipe. However,
in this case we might be able to say that some lost sales were due to the
lower price EasySwipe was able to charge for using the patented interface.
Of course none of EasySwipes sales could have been made if its products
were not compatible with iPads and iPhones But that is not value
attributable to the patent and the law should not compensate for that loss.143
These two examples illustrate the problem with awarding lost profits in
the contexts. It is simply impossible to distinguish between value stemming
from the technical contribution the patent makes and value from helping a
produce achieve compatibility. That is why the sole remedy that the law
should award to necessary interface patents is a modified reasonable
royalty. The next section explains how that royalty should be calculated.
patentee’s damages are “the difference between his pecuniary condition after the
infringement, and what his condition would have been if the infringement had not
occurred”).
141
To obtain lost profits a patentee must show: “(1) demand for the patented product,
(2) [the] absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) [her] manufacturing and
marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of profit [s]he would have
made.” Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
142
I suggest a different beneficial feature because charging iPads and iPhones quickly
does not appear to benefit the card swiper.
143
Bohannan and Hovenkamp apply this kind of argument to the sale of related
products (e.g. Apple’s lost swiper sales might also caused it to lose software sales). They
say the loss of such sales should not be considered a compensable IP Injury. Bohannan &
Hovenkamp supra note 104 at _.
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2. Reasonable Royalties
The preceding section rejected lost profits theory in favor of
calculating damages based on the value the patentee contributed to the
infringing product. That is essentially a royalty calculation, albeit not the
one the courts now use. In its current form, a “reasonable royalty” is
calculated using the Georgia-Pacific test.144 Jurors are instructed to
ascertain the royalty that the parties would have agreed upon had they
successfully negotiated a license just before infringement began. The
hypothetical negotiation assumes that the patent at issue is valid and
infringed. There are a mind-boggling fifteen factors that are used to
calculate the royalty under this analysis.145 The ninth factor is the factor that
144

See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). Reasonable royalty awards can
also be calculated using “the so-called ‘analytical approach.’” See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura
Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986); accord JOHN SKENYON ET AL., PATENT
DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 3:8 (2013). But this test is almost never used. Therefore, I
will not address it. See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific
Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1673
(“Today, nearly all reasonable royalty awards are based on the fifteen-factor [GeorgiaPacific] test . . . .”).
145 See Ga.-Pac., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. The factors are:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit,
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the
patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as,
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or
whether they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products
of the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of
sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed
sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices,
if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those
who have used the invention.
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accounts for the contribution the patent makes over the prior art.
Apportionment would bring this factor to the forefront by asking the court
to: 1) isolate the particular patented advance, 2) distinguish it from the prior
art, and 3) and ask the fact finder to assess on royalty on that invention.146
Until just recently, reasonable royalty awards implicitly included
compatibility value.147 For example, factor four is “[t]he licensor's
established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly
by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under
special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.”148 This factor
assumes that a patentee can use necessary interface patents to foreclose
competition in products that use the interface.149 Royalty awards are
increased royalty if it has such policy. In other words, if Gillette has a
policy of forbidding others from making compatible razors, an infringer
would have to pay higher damages for infringing an interface patent than it
otherwise would even if the patent did not cover any real advance.
Factor eight considers the commercial success and popularity of
products made under the patent.150 Returning to the Lightning interface
example, Apple could rely on this to discuss the value of connecting to
Apple products. At the time of first infringement (i.e. when the swiper
enters the market), the parties will have already understood that a license to
the Lightning interface will allow EasySwipe to sell its product to the Apple
community. For many products, iPhone and iPad compatibility can be the
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been
reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a
prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to
manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention—would have
been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which
amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a
license.
146
Landers, supra note 112 at 473-74.
147
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1229-31 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(explaining how various Georgia-Pacific factors were inconsistent how parties approach
standards essential patents).
148
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
149
See supra notes 122 to 124 and accompanying text explaining that permanent
injunctions are typically issued in the present of direct competition.
150
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
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difference between success and failure.151 Because Apple has the leverage,
we would expect Apple to negotiate for a large portion of the swiper’s
expected profits.
Of course this argument has no relationship to the size of any
improvement associated with the interface. That is true even though the
ninth Georgia-Pacific factor discusses advantages of the patent over old
modes and devices. It is very unlikely that this factor is given much weight
in most damages calculations. The Georgia-Pacific test “overloads the jury
with factors to consider that may be irrelevant, overlapping, or even
contradictory.”152 The result is that for years, patentees could try to obscure
apportionment principles by using compatibility value arguments to push
for a high royalty.
Thankfully, the Federal Circuit has just recently issued two decisions
excluding innovation value from reasonable royalty recoveries in the
context of standards essential patents. In the first case, Ericsson sued DLink on three patents that were necessary to the 802.11(n) Wi-Fi wireless
standard.153 Before the lawsuit, Ericsson had agreed to license these patents
on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (RAND) as part of the
standards process.154 The jury found that D-Link infringed the three patents
and awarded Ericsson $10 million (approximately 15 cents per infringing
device). On appeal, D-Link argued, that the district court erred by giving the
jury “the customary Georgia-Pacific factors.”155 According to D-Link some
of these factors were either inapplicable or misleading because Ericsson was
obligated to license its patents under reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms.156 Noting that this was an issue of first impression, the Federal
Circuit agreed with D-Link and found that factors 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 were not
applicable in the RAND context or needed some modification.157
But the Federal Circuit did not just discuss the problems with the
Georgia-Pacific factors, the decision took a step further and instructed the
lower court to apportion value in the RAND context based on innovation
and compatibility values, albeit using different language. The decision first
noted that a standards essential patent is not always used because “it is the
151

Carl Shapiro & Hal Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network
Economy, 179-82 (1999) (explaining how consumer demand is higher for products that
operate on successful platforms).
152
Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 627, 628 (2010); see also, Christopher B.
Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent
Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1697–98 (discussing difficulties with the fifteen factor
test).
153
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
154
Id. at 1209.
155
Id. at 1229.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 1229-31.
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best or only option; it is used because its use is necessary to comply with
the standard.”158 In other words, the court recognized that standards
essential patents have both innovation value and compatibility value and
distinguished between the two. The court went on to hold that “the royalty
for SEPs should reflect the approximate value of that technological
contribution, not the value of its widespread adoption due to the
standardization.”159 In other words, the court excluded compatibility value
from the recovery. To implement this form of apportionment, the court
concluded that jury must be told to consider the difference between the
added value of the technological invention and the added value of that
invention’s standardization.”160 Subsequently, in CSIRO v. Cisco, the
Federal Circuit vacated another damages award because the district court
had failed to ensure that jury distinguished between the value of the patents
and the value of the standard that they covered.161 Importantly, the decision
found that Ericsson v. D-Link’s holding was not limited to patents
encumbered by an obligation to license on RAND terms, but also applied to
“SEPs generally.162
These developments represent significant progress and demonstrate
that the courts are beginning to appreciate the distinction between
innovation and compatibility values. However, these reforms need to go
further. First, in the context of reasonable royalties, the Federal Circuit
should extend Ericsson v D-Link’s many holdings so they don’t just apply
to standard essential patents. Neither Gillette’s razor/handle interfaces nor
Apple’s Lightning connectors are part of any formal standard. Yet, the
patents are certainly necessary for companies that want to make and sell
products that operate in those environments. Therefore, the principles relied
upon in Ericsson v. D-Link’s apply with equal force to necessary interface
patents. Juries should be instructed to exclude compatibility value from
reasonable royalty calculations. Moreover, if the Federal Circuit is serious
about preventing patentees from recovering compatibility value, it needs to
stop issuing eliminate injunctions and awarding lost profits for necessary
interface patents. As discussed earlier, these remedies also implicitly award
compatibility value.
V. EPILOG: FIVE ODDLY DIFFERENT VIEWS OF TYING
Up to this point, the article has discussed the problem of horizontal
158
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160
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innovation in the context of interface patents. From a patent perspective
these patents don’t make sense because the public is giving something (i.e.
a patent) for nothing (i.e. technology that is no better what we have). That
insight helps us understand that there is a component of all interface patents
that suffer from the same problem. Because of the remedies patent law
provides, those patents possess compatibility value. The proposals made
here proceeds within that general framework. That means that my proposals
rely on patent values and take a very patent centric view of the law.
But I would be remiss if I did not mention that companies don’t just
patent interfaces to tie products and close platforms. There are at least four
other commonly used tactics that accomplish the same goals. First,
companies force ties on customers through contracts. In other words, they
require purchasers of one product (e.g. printers) to buy the company’s other
product (e.g. ink). Second, they redesign their products to render their
competitors complementary products useless. Third, based on the recent
Oracle v. Google decision, companies can now try to obtain copyright
protection for software interfaces that help products achieve
compatibility.163 Fourth, companies are now seeking to use the DMCA’s
(Digital Millennium Copyright Act) anti-circumvention provisions to
prevent competitors from making compatible products. Oddly, different
substantive laws govern these tactics: namely patent, antitrust, traditional
copyright and the DMCA. Not surprisingly the motivating principles
underlying these laws, the standards they apply and the results they yield
are all different. The following discussion gives a very brief discussion of
each of these tactics and the law that governs them.
A. Antitrust and Contractual Tying
Perhaps, the most well-known form of tying occurs when a company
contractually obligates a customer of one product to also buy other products
from it. Examples include: tying salt tablets to salt machines164 and tying
ink to printers.165 To the extent these arrangements are challenged as illegal,
the issue is governed by antitrust law.
Historically, the Supreme Court has condemned tying arrangements. By
as early as 1947, the Court lumped tying together with price fixing and
declared that such conduct was a per se violation of the antitrust laws.166
163

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 2887 (2015).
164
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)
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Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
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Int'l Salt, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (violations of both Section 1 of the Sherman
Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act were found).
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The Court would subsequently say “[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any
purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”167 However, over the
years, the Supreme Court gradually became more accepting of tying.168 By
1984, the Court acknowledged that not all ties were harmful saying:
It is clear, however, that not every refusal to sell two products separately
can be said to restrain competition . . . Buyers often find package sales
attractive; a seller's decision to offer such packages can merely be an
attempt to compete effectively -- conduct that is entirely consistent with
the Sherman Act.169
Later in Jefferson Parish, the Court took a step back from true per se
liability, and limited liability to those situations in which: 1) the seller has
market power over the tying product, 2) there must be a substantial threat
that seller will acquire market power in the market for the tied product, and
3) the tying and tied products must be distinct (i.e. not a single product).170
This approach to tying has been labeled quasi per se liability.171 The
practice is not strictly per se unlawful because, unlike decisions on price
fixing, the courts inquire into market power and whether the practice
actually prevents consumers from taking a competing product.172 The law is
also not applying the rule of reason because plaintiffs have no serious
obligation to establish anticompetitive effects and defendants have little
opportunity to establish efficiencies.173 In sum, antitrust law assesses the
enforceability of contractual ties by relying on classic antitrust
considerations like, market power, market definition and threats to
competition.
167

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 518 (1969)(in dissent, Justice
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B. Antitrust and Tech Ties
Another form of tie also falls under antitrust law’s domain. Companies
often redesign their products to make it difficult, if not impossible, for other
company’s complementary products to work with them. The goal is to make
it practically difficult for customers to choose anything but the companies
own complementary products. Bohannan and Hovencamp have called this
form of implicit tying a “tech tie.”174
A simple example involves Green Mountain Coffee, manufacturer of
the Keurig line of single serving coffee makers.175 After its patent on KCups expired, Green Mountain redesigned its coffee makers to detect
whether someone had inserted a Keurig’s K-Cups coffee cartridge or a
competitor’s. If it was a competitor’s cartridge, the machine would not brew
coffee. There was a public outcry against the new design and several
competitors sued Green Mountain for violating antitrust law.176 Eventually
Green Mountain withdrew its new design.177
Tech ties occur frequently in the technology industry. In the 90’s,
Microsoft redesigned Windows so that it was difficult if not impossible to
remove its browser, Microsoft Explorer.178 This tactic discouraged personal
computer makers from including competing browsers in their computers.
Because Microsoft was unable to justify the design changes, the courts
eventually found that Microsoft had violated Section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.179
By focusing on whether Microsoft’s new design was justified (i.e.
somehow better that what previously existed), antitrust law has adopted a
seemingly patent like perspective to assessing tech ties. It first asks whether
174

Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 104 at 320.
Glenn Manishan, Antitrust, DRM & Coffee: Is It Illegal For Keurig To Lock Down
Its Brewers?
176
See Dan D’Ambrosio, Lawsuits claim K-Cup maker violates antitrust laws, USA
Today
(Apr.
22,.
2014)
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/22/lawsuits-claim-k-cup-makerviolates-antitrust-laws/8028197/ (mentioning 12 consumer class actions and two lawsuits
brought by competitors).
177
Fred Barbash, Keurig’s K-Cup screw-up and how it K-pitulated to angry
consumers,
The
Washington
Post,
(May
7
2015)
available
at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/05/07/keurigs-k-cup-screwup-and-how-it-k-pitulated-wednesday-to-angry-consumers/
178
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) Microsoft
redesigned its Windows operating systems so that its browser, Explorer, could not be
removed through the add/remove program utility. It also commingled Explorer code with
Windows code.
179
U.S v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 66-67.
175

3-Feb-16]

Horizontal Innovation

43

the new design improves on the previous design. If it has, that ends the
inquiry and there is no antitrust violation even in the presence of monopoly
power and competitive harm.180 Interestingly, antitrust law appears to
associate the existence of the patent with product improvement even though
patents can cover horizontal technology.181
If the new design is not an improvement, the analysis follows the more
traditional antitrust analysis. Companies with market power can be found
liable for redesigning their products to injure competition.182 But the larger
point is that antitrust law treats contractual ties and tech ties somewhat
differently. These discrepancies become more pronounced when we move
to types of tying that lie in the patent and copyright regimes.
C. Copyrights and Software
With its decision in Oracle v. Google, the Federal Circuit has just
opened the door for software developers to try to tie products together using
traditional copyright law.183 The primary issue in the case was whether
Oracle could protect critical parts of Java’s application programming
interfaces (“API)”) using traditional copyright law.184 An API is, generally
speaking, a software specification that allows programs to communicate
with each other.
By the time Google began to create its own Android operating system
for mobile devices, Java was already ubiquitous. Google sought to make
Android OS Java compatible so that it would be able to run smoothly on the
many websites that used Java. While Google wrote its own code to
180
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implement Java185, Google did copy the declaring code of 37 different Java
packages as well as the structure sequence and organization of that code.186
Google justified its actions by saying that it needed to copy those portions
of Java to achieve compatibility. For many, Google’s arguments seemed
well founded.187
To begin with, U.S.C. § 102(b) explicitly limits copyright protection:
“[i]n no case does copyright protection . . . extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied” in a protected work. Additionally, numerous earlier decisions
had held that copyright protection cannot extend to functional elements.188
However, the Federal Circuit rejected these arguments by identifying
different ways to achieve the functions at issue. First, the court said that
Google could have made its own different declaring code to achieve the
same result it had achieved with Android.189 Second, the Court pointed out
that Sun/Oracle also had different choices when creating Java.190 Given
these different choices, the Federal Circuit reasoned that Oracle was not
seeking to protect the underlying idea, just the expressions Java used.191
While the decision is undoubtedly correct about the different ways to
perform the vast majority of Java’s functions, there is one function the court
ignores, achieving compatibility. Apparently, the Federal Circuit does not
believe that achieving compatibility is a recognizable function.
This omission suggests that companies can design their products to
require certain software handshaking protocols and then use copyright law
to protect those protocols.192 After all competitors can clearly write different
185
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software that performs the same handshaking function, albeit without
achieving compatibility. In effect, this allows for a kind of software tie.193
However, unlike the way antitrust law deals with tying, copyright law will
assess the legality of such software ties by either verifying that various
ways of handshaking are possible (following Oracle v. Google) or declaring
that such software covers unprotectable functions (following earlier
precedent).194
D. The DCMA and Anti-circumvention
Companies like John Deere and General Motors recently attempted to
use the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (DMCA) anti-circumvention
provisions to tie products to their tractors and cars. Passed in 1998, the
DMCA includes provisions that focus on those who provide technology for
overcoming technological protection measure. Specifically, § 1201(a)(1)(A)
states: “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under [the Copyright]
title.”195 In effect, the statute bars breaking into any copyrighted work that
the copyright owner has purposefully locked up using technology.”196
To prevent these restrictions from threatening traditionally protected
uses,197 the DCMA contained a number of exemptions.198 It also required
the Librarian of Congress to periodically conduct a rulemaking proceeding
to identify further classes of exemptions.199 During the most recent such
proceeding, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) proposed an
exemption for “Vehicle Software – Diagnosis Repair, or Modification.”200
The purpose of such an exemption is to allow owners to freely personalize,

migrated back into copyright’s realm big time)
193
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modify, or otherwise improve their cars.201
John Deere and General Motors, among others, objected to this
exemption.202 John Deere’s comments are fairly representative of the larger
industry response. It argued that such an exemption “will make it possible
for pirates, third-party software developers, and less innovative competitors
to free-ride off the creativity, unique expression and ingenuity of vehicle
software designed by leading vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers.”203
Of course companies that make complementary products need to
circumvent the vehicle’s technological protection measures to make their
products compatible with the vehicle’s software. In its reply, EFF identified
a number of such complementary products. They include new products for
“repair, diagnosis and modification, such as scan tools that compete with
those of the manufacturer, custom dash computers, and apps, and tools to
reprogram an ECU [engine control unit] to accept an aftermarket part.”204
In late 2015, the Librarian of Congress issued its decision and adopted an
exemption substantially along the lines that the EFF requested. 205 The
result is that, for the most party, others may circumvent the technological
protection measures that automobile manufacturers use to prevent
modifications to their automobile software.
But while the Librarian of Congress was focused on the narrow question
of whether a particular technology protection measure could be
circumvented, the larger question is one of tying. The automobile industry
sought to use the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions to prevent
potential competitors from making products that work with their vehicles. If
they had succeeded, customers will only be able to buy such products from
the original manufacturer (e.g. John Deere itself) or their licensees. Put
more concretely, a company like GM will be able to tie complementary
goods like a new exhaust to the sale of the original car by virtue of the
technological protection measures it placed in the original car.206 The
success or failure of these tying attempts depended on whether the
exemption was approved.
201
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Approval of an anti-circumvention exemption is based on five factors.
They are: (1) the availability for use of copyrighted works, (2) the
availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and
educational purposes; (3) the impact that the prohibition on the
circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has
on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, (4) scholarship, or
research; the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the
market for or value of copyrighted works; and (5) such other factors as the
Librarian considers appropriate.207
Of course these factors are quite different than the ones patent, antitrust
law and traditional copyright law use to assess the different forms of tying
that fall within their respective jurisdictions. But these tactics all seek to
accomplish the same result. They seek to force consumers that buy one
product to purchase a second complementary product. Now in general, the
legality of a particular tactic should not turn on which legal/technical
approach a company uses.
We would expect that antitrust theory is best suited to provide principles
to apply across all these forms of tying. But antitrust law suffers from two
problems. First, antitrust scholars cannot agree when tying facilitates or
harms competition. Second, even if a consensus develops, its not clear that
the law could implement those principles cost-efficiently or effectively.
Regardless, this article does not attempt to step into antitrust law’s tying
morass. Rather, I merely explain how patent law should address the
interface patent problem using patent values.

VI. CONCLUSION
By studying the motivations for patenting horizontal innovation, this
Article is able to identify two distinct types of values that interface patents
possess, compatibility value and innovation value. Using three real world
examples, the article explains why awarding compatibility value is
inconsistent with the goals of the patent system. Accordingly, this Article
proposes changes to the remedies patent law awards. Specifically, I
recommend that courts no longer issues injunctions or award lost profits for
necessary interface patents. Instead, they should only award reasonable
royalties that are calibrated to the magnitude of the patent’s contribution
while specifically excluding compatibility value.
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